Abstract. The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length and a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits long, which employs a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. In this paper, we describe a few 5 and 6-round properties of Camellia and finally use them to give meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include the FL/FL −1 functions but do not include whitening operations.
additional whitening operations at both ends. Camellia became a CRYPTREC egovernment recommended cipher [7] in 2002, a NESSIE selected block cipher [26] in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO international standard [16] in 2005. In this work, we consider the version of Camellia that has the FL/FL −1 functions, and for simplicity, we denote by Camellia-128/192/256 the three versions of Camellia that use 128, 192 and 256 key bits, respectively.
The security of Camellia has been analysed against a variety of cryptanalytic techniques, including differential cryptanalysis [5] , truncated differential cryptanalysis [17] , higher-order differential cryptanalysis [17, 20] , linear cryptanalysis [25] , integral cryptanalysis [8, 15, 19] , boomerang attack [30] , rectangle attack [4] , collision attack and impossible differential cryptanalysis [3, 18] ; and many cryptanalytic results on Camellia have been published [2, 6, 11-13, 21-24, 27-29, 31 , 32], of which impossible differential cryptanalysis is the most efficient technique in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds, that broke 11-round Camellia-128, 12-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 [2, 22] , presented most recently at FSE 2012 and ISPEC 2012.
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The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack was introduced in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman [10] . It usually treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}
n × {0,
n as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E a • E b . Given a guess for the subkeys used in E a and E b , if a plaintext produces just after E a the same value as the corresponding ciphertext produces just before E b , then this guess for the subkeys is likely to be correct; otherwise, this guess must be incorrect. Thus, we can find the correct subkey, given a sufficient number of matching plaintext-ciphertext pairs in a known-plaintext attack scenario. In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, things may get better, and as in [9] , by choosing a set of plaintexts with a particular property we may be able to express the concerned value-in-the-middle as a function of plaintext and a smaller number of unknown constants than the number of unknown constants (of the same length) from the subkey involved.
In 2011 Lu et al. [24] proposed an extension of the MitM attack, known as the higher-order MitM (HO-MitM) attack, which is based on using multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-the-middle". The HO-MitM attack technique can lead to some better cryptanalytic results than the MitM attack technique in certain circumstances. In particular, Lu et al. found some 5 and 6-round HOMitM properties of Camellia that were used to break 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256, but the corresponding 5 and 6-round MitM properties can enable us to break only 12-round Camellia-256.
In this paper, we analyse the security of Camellia (with the FL/FL −1 functions) against the MitM attack in detail, following the work in [24] . In all those 5 and 6-round (higher-order) MitM properties of Camellia due to Lu et al. [24] , the basic unit of value-in-the-middle is one byte long. Nevertheless, we observe that if we consider only a smaller number of bits of the concerned byte, instead of the whole 8 bits, a few 5 and 6-round MitM properties with a smaller number of unknown 1-bit constant parameters can be obtained. This is due to the fact that an output bit of the FL −1 function only relies on a small fraction of the bits of the subkey used in the FL −1 function (as well as a few input bits to FL −1 ), thus reducing the number of unknown 1-bit constant parameters when we consider a fraction of the bits of the concerned byte. As a consequence, the 5 and 6-round MitM properties can be used to conduct MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256, (all of which include the FL/FL −1 functions). Table 1 summarises previous, our and the newly emerging main cryptanalytic results on Camellia (with FL/FL −1 functions), where CP, ACPC and CC refer respectively to the numbers of chosen plaintexts, adap-tively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, and chosen ciphertexts, Enc. refers to the required number of encryption operations of the relevant reduced version of Camellia, and MA refers to the required numbers of memory accesses.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the notation and the Camellia block cipher. We give the 5 and 6-round MitM properties in Section 3, and present our cryptanalytic results on Camellia-128/192/256 in Sections 4-6, respectively. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section we give the notation used throughout this paper, and then briefly describe the Camellia block cipher.
Notation
The bits of a value are numbered from left to right, starting with 1. We use the following notation throughout this paper. 
The Camellia Block Cipher
Camellia [1] has a Feistel structure, a 128-bit block length, and a user key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. It uses the following five functions:
64 is a non-linear substitution constructed by applying eight 8 × 8-bit S-boxes S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 5 , S 6 , S 7 and S 8 in parallel to the input, where S 1 and S 8 are identical, S 2 and S 5 are identical, S 3 and S 6 are identical, and S 4 and S 7 are identical.
is a linear permutation which is equivalent to premultiplication by a 8 × 8 byte matrix P; the matrix P and its reverse P 
Camellia uses a total of four 64-bit whitening subkeys KW j , 2⌊ [1] for its detail). Finally, the subkeys are as follows.
Below is the encryption procedure Camellia, where P is a 128-bit plaintext, represented as 16 bytes, and
We refer to the ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description as Round i, and write K i,j for the j-th byte of
5 rounds: 6 rounds: functions between Rounds 6 and 7), and the 6-round Camellia is from Rounds 3 to 8; see Fig. 1 . These properties are given below, and their proof is given in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1. Suppose a set of 256 sixteen-byte values
, where 0 ω 6. 
If
Note that it can be seen from the proof that several 1-bit constants can be cancelled if we take XOR under two different inputs, but such a resulting attack is termed a HO-MitM attack [24] , which has a slightly different tradeoff on data/time/memory compared with our attack given below, mostly on memory.
Attacking 10-Round Camellia-128
A simple analysis on the key schedule of Camellia-128 reveals the following property.
Property 1 For Camellia-128, given a value of
The 5-round property given in Proposition 1-1 can enable us to break 10-round Camellia-128 with FL/FL −1 functions. Below is the procedure for attacking Rounds 2 to 11, where the 5-round property with ω = 0 is used from Rounds 4 to 8, and the approach used to choose plaintexts with δ was introduced in [23] . 6 , and define a secret parameter δ to be
Guess a value for (K
, and we denote the guessed value by (K *
In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain the ciphertexts for the plaintexts; we denote by C (x) the ciphertext for plaintext P (x) . 4. Guess a value for (K 9,7 , K 10 
Finally, check whether the sequence ( 10-round Camellia-128 encryptions.
Attacking 11-Round Camellia-192
Both the 5 and 6-round properties given in Proposition 1 can be used to attack 11-round Camellia-192 with FL/FL −1 functions. We first describe such an attack based on the 5-round property. The following property holds for Camellia-192. 
Property 2 For Camellia
R ) in the following way, where α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α 8 , β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β 7 are randomly chosen 8-bit constants:
In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain the ciphertexts for the plaintexts; we denote by C (x) the ciphertext for plaintext P We can use the 6-round property given in Proposition 1-2 to mount an attack on 12-round Camellia-256 with FL/FL −1 functions. We attack Rounds 7 to 18, and use the property with ω = 1. The attack procedure is as follows.
For each of 2
179 possible values of the 179 one-bit parameters c 6 , and define a secret parameter δ to be 
R ) in the same way as in the 10-round Camellia-128 attack described in Section 4, (x = 0, 1, · · · , 255). In a chosenplaintext attack scenario, obtain the ciphertexts for the plaintexts; we denote by C (x) the ciphertext for plaintext P (x) . 4. Guess a value for (K 15, 6 
Finally, check whether the sequence ( , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , m 6 , m 7 , m 8 , x, m 9 , m 10 , m 11 , m 12 , m 13 , m 14 , m 15 ) ≈ 2 219.9 12-round Camellia-256 encryptions. In Step 4, for the correct guess of (
, the probability that the sequence (
, (assuming the event has a binomial distribution). Consequently, it is expected that at most 2
Step 5 takes at most 2 128 12-round Camellia-256 encryptions. Therefore, the attack has a memory complexity of 2 185 bytes and a total time complexity of approximately 2 219.9 12-round Camellia-256 encryptions. It is worthy to observe that we can also apply the 6-round property with ω = 1 to break two other series of 12-round Camellia-256 with FL/ FL −1 functions, namely Rounds 1 to 12 and Rounds 13 to 24. Similarly, the attack has the same data and memory complexity as the above 12-round Camellia-256 attack, but has a total time complexity of approximately 2
12-round Camellia-256 encryptions.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the security of Camellia against the MitM attack in detail, following the work in [24] . We have presented 5 and 6-round properties of Camellia, that can be used to conduct MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256, all of which include the FL/FL −1 functions but do not include whitening operations. The presented attacks are theoretical, like most cryptanalytic attacks on block ciphers.
Our results show that as far as Camellia is concerned, the semi-advanced MitM attack technique is more efficient than or at least as efficient as the advanced cryptanalytic techniques studied, except impossible differential cryptanalysis; in this latter case the MitM attacks are now one or two rounds inferior to the best newly emerging impossible differential cryptanalysis results in [2, 22] .
We attribute these MitM attacks to the fact that the FL −1 function does not have a good avalanche effect (i.e., an output bit relied on a large number of the bits of the input and the subkey used). If the FL −1 function were modified to have a good avalanche effect, then those MitM properties would involve a large number of unknown 1-bit constant parameters, and the resulting MitM attacks would be ineffective for the resulting cipher, but nevertheless it does not necessarily resist the HO-MitM attack technique, for those HO-MitM attacks described in [24] work as long as that integral property of Camellia holds (canceling the FL −1 function). Actually, if the FL/FL −1 functions had had a good avalanche effect, the Camellia cipher could have withstood the best currently known cryptanalytic results that are the newly emerging impossible differential cryptanalysis results [2, 22] . In this sense, the FL/FL −1 functions do play an important role in the security of Camellia. 
When encrypting X (i) , we denote by Y (i) t the value immediately after the S operation of Round t, and by W (i) t the value immediately after the P operation of Round t, (3 t 8).
We have Eq. (1) for Rounds 4 to 8 and have Eq. (2) for Rounds 3 to 8.
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(1)
We first prove Proposition 1-1, and focus on encrypting X (i) through Rounds 4 to 8 below. 
The output immediately before the FL/FL −1 functions is as follows, where 6, 8 ; and e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e 8 are 8-bit constants completely determined by a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 8 and
By Property 4-1, we know that FL( L
6 , by Property 4-2 we know that 
5,3 = S 1 (S 1 (
5,4 = S 2 (S 1 (
5,5 = S 1 (S 1 (
5,7 = S 3 (S 1 ( 
